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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMAR PURCELL COLES,
                                                           Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 1-07-cr-00210-001)
District Judge:  Honorable Yvette Kane
____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
June 24, 2010
Before:  SMITH, FISHER and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 29, 2010)
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Jamar Purcell Coles pled guilty to attempted possession of cocaine with intent to
distribute and now appeals his conviction and sentence.  His counsel seeks to withdraw
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction1
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
2
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).  We will grant counsel’s motion
and affirm.1
I.
We write exclusively for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts necessary to our
analysis.
Coles negotiated to buy $40,000 worth of cocaine from an individual who was in
fact an FBI confidential informant.  Law enforcement officers arrested Coles before the
transaction was consummated.  Coles was thereafter charged with one count of attempted
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and
one forfeiture count.  Coles pled guilty to the attempted possession charge and the
government dropped the forfeiture count.  The District Court sentenced him to 130
months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.  Coles subsequently filed a
timely pro se notice of appeal.  Counsel has been appointed to represent Coles on appeal
and now seeks to withdraw pursuant to Anders.
II.
In this Court, counsel may seek to withdraw representation under Anders if, after
reviewing the district court’s record, he or she is “persuaded that the appeal presents no
3issue of even arguable merit . . . .”  3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a) (2008).  To grant counsel’s
request, we must be satisfied that counsel “has thoroughly scoured the record in search of
appealable issues and . . . explain[ed] why the issues are frivolous.”  United States v.
Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 319 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).  Our “inquiry when counsel submits an Anders brief is thus twofold: 
(1) whether counsel adequately fulfilled the . . . requirements [of 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a)];
and (2) whether an independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” 
United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).  If we
determine that “the Anders brief initially appears adequate on its face,” the second step of
our inquiry is “guided . . . by the Anders brief itself.”  Id. at 301 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
In this case, counsel’s Anders brief appears adequate on its face.  Counsel presents
two arguably appealable issues:  (1) whether the District Court’s plea colloquy violated
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and (2) whether the District Court’s sentence
was unreasonable.  Coles was invited to file a pro se brief and, at his request, was given
an extension of time to do so.  He has elected not to submit his own brief.  Accordingly,
we will focus on the issues counsel has submitted for our review.
A. Plea Colloquy
The first issue counsel has identified is the possibility that the District Court
violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 during its plea colloquy with Coles.  Rule
411 governs guilty pleas generally and obligates district courts to question defendants and
advise them of certain rights and consequences before accepting a plea.  These
obligations are meant to ensure that a plea is knowing and voluntary as well as grounded
in fact.  We ordinarily exercise plenary review over a district court’s compliance vel non
with Rule 11, see United States v. Ebel, 299 F.3d 187, 190-91 (3d Cir. 2002), except
where, as here, the defendant fails to object to a purported Rule 11 error, in which case
the defendant must meet the plain-error standard by showing that (1) there was an error,
(2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. 
United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 928-29 (3d Cir. 2008).
The record in this case shows that the District Court engaged in an extensive back-
and-forth with Coles by asking him a series of questions in an effort to ensure that he
understood the nature and consequences of his actions, including the relinquishment of
his right to appeal.  Coles’ answers to these questions reflect his understanding.  The
Court also asked Coles whether he had been coerced or threatened or whether anyone had
promised him anything in exchange for his guilty plea.  Coles answered these questions in
the negative.  The Court also explained at length how Coles’ sentence would be
calculated and instructed him that the selection of his sentence would be exclusively in
the Court’s hands.  Following this discussion with Coles, the Court expressly found that
Coles had “knowingly and intelligently waiv[ed] his rights to trial,” and thus accepted his
plea.  (App. 35.)  Because the District Court more than adequately conformed to Rule
511’s dictates, we see no error, plain or otherwise, in the way it conducted the plea
colloquy.  See United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 192-96 (3d Cir. 2007); cf. United
States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 202-03 & n.4 (3d Cir. 2006).  We therefore agree with
Coles’ counsel that any challenge in this vein would be frivolous.
B. Sentencing
The second issue counsel has identified is the potential unreasonableness of Coles’
sentence.  We review both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261-62
(2005); United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  District
courts in this circuit must follow a three-step sentencing process.  United States v. Gunter,
462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  Specifically, a district court must (1) calculate a
defendant’s Guidelines range; (2) rule on any motions for departure, stating the basis for
its decisions; and (3) consider the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether to
exercise its discretion and grant a variance.  Id.  “For a sentence to be substantively
reasonable, a district court must apply the § 3553(a) factors reasonably to the
circumstances of the case.”  Lessner, 498 F.3d at 204 (citation omitted).
Here, the District Court followed the process outlined above in keeping with our
precedents.  The Court properly calculated Coles’ Guidelines range as 130-162 months’
imprisonment after granting the government’s motion for a downward departure.  The
Court then heard from Coles, his counsel, and the prosecutor regarding Coles’ personal
6background, and explicitly discussed the nature and circumstances of Coles’ offense, his
history and characteristics, the need to protect society, and the kinds of sentences
available.  In light of these considerations, the Court sentenced Coles to 130 months’
imprisonment, the bottom of his Guidelines range.  On this record, we see no basis for
concluding that the District Court’s sentence was procedurally unreasonable. 
Furthermore, because the sentence “falls within the broad range of possible sentences that
can be considered reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors,” United States v. Wise, 515
F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir. 2008), we likewise see no reason to upset it on the ground that it is
substantively unreasonable.  Accordingly, we agree with counsel that this issue is likewise
frivolous.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm
the District Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence.
